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DEBATING "BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS" SYMPOSIUM
Investors’ Rights Short of 
Human Rights in a 
Constitutional Perspective
It will come as no surprise for readers familiar with Anne 
Peters’ reflections on the international legal system to grasp 
from her Jenseits der Menschenrechte that also foreign 
investors are vested with rights rooted in international law 

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(257-307). This phenomenon is linked to a continuous 
process of internationalisation of legal relationships with 
host states. But indeed neither the very nature of that 
process nor that of their rights are well established in 
doctrinal works. While for an investor internationalisation 
means emancipation from both the home state – diplomatic 
protection being put aside – and the domestic jurisdictions 
of the host state – local remedies being bypassed in fact or 
in law –, internationalisation does not so obviously rhyme 
with full publicization of these relationships and the 
settlement of disputes they generate. 
Moreover, the nature of investors’ rights remains disputed: 
Are they proper rights of the foreign investor? If they are 
proper rights are they to be assimilated into human rights or 
do they belong to a distinct category, subject to a distinct 
regime? Are they enforceable in domestic legal systems 
despite (often) originating in international treaties? The 
latter question would become pivotal if states were to 
reintroduce the condition of exhaustion of local remedies 
prior to arbitration or refuse to consent to arbitration. The 
insertion of investors’ rights protection in a national and/or 
(hypothetical) international/global constitutional system is 
ultimately at stake. To put it provocatively: Are foreign 
investors’ rights to be protected beyond domestic 
constitutional systems? Is the protection by arbitral 
tribunals in any way comparable to the protection granted 
to human rights by international courts? Does a privilege of 
jurisdiction fit into a global constitutional system that is still 
a work in progress?
Departing from her previous publications on global 
constitutionalism – and from a divided literature on 
constitutionalism in the face of investor-state arbitration 
Page 2 of 11Investors’ Rights Short of Human Rights in a Constitutional Perspective | Völkerrecht...
05.10.2017https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/investors-rights-short-of-human-rights-in-a-constitutiona...
(and vice versa), referred to here and there but not key to 
her demonstration –, Anne Peters focuses instead on the 
international status of private persons. Her point is much 
more the existence, if not of a homogeneous international 
status for investors, at least of a set of procedural and 
material rights of their own. Methodically demonstrating the 
consistency of these rights, she illuminates some still 
controversial issues and leaves others in an enduring 
twilight. The short comment submitted here follows her 
path, but reintroduces constitutionalist and publicist 
concerns.
Proper procedural rights
Concerning an investor’s right to go to arbitration, it results 
either from a state contract or statute alone or in 
combination with international instruments (and quite often 
from the ICSID-Convention and/or a BIT) or from the latter 
alone. It is, then, genuinely an international right (259, 264).
The consecration of such a procedural right in investment 
law was established first and early in striking contrast to 
international humanitarian law (258): Foreign investors were 
in the position to directly or indirectly negotiate access to 
international fora. However, considering a historical 
approach of this achievement, Anne Peters prefers a 
questioning on the legal nature of the agreement to arbitrate 
and favors its submission to international law, especially 
when backed by an international treaty (261). Yet, there 
remain other intriguing issues.
Some of them relate to the ICSID Convention itself: Is that 
treaty deemed to create proper procedural rights for foreign 
investors or are all procedural rights enshrined in other 
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instruments (BIT, domestic statute, investor-state contract)? 
While not hinting at states’ statements supporting it, Anne 
Peters supports the former view (262). Suppose she is right: 
Is the Convention self-executing? To my knowledge, the 
doctrine has paid little attention to that question, but an 
investor could raise such an issue in a dispute with the host 
state brought before domestic courts to have them declare a 
change in the law irregular or ineffective by virtue of the 
trumping effect of the Convention (for instance, if a statute 
were deemed to retroactively repeal the consent given by 
the state in a previous statute or in contracts with investors, 
or if a statute were contradicting art. 54.1 of the ICSID 
Convention). Or simply, absent any statute implementing the 
ICSID Convention, to have domestic courts enforce an 
award. A swift parallel to the kind of issues raised in Medellin 
v. Texas decided by the Supreme Court of the United States 
on March 25, 2008 makes this question not simply 
speculative. 
Other uncertainties come up when the ICSID Convention is 
not applicable. Does the statutory offer of the host state 
have the same value and status as an international unilateral 
commitment – towards a private person? Arbitral tribunals 
have assumed that unilateral acts may internationally 
commit states towards investors (ICSID, Mobil Corporation 
Venezuela Holdings B.V. v. Venezuela, June 10, 2010, n° 
ARB/07/27, §§ 84-85); yet, the regime of an offer made 
outside any treaty framework remains uncertain: Is it to be 
interpreted restrictively or not? (ICSID, Tidewater inc. v. 
Venezuela, n° ARB/10/5, February 8, 2013, §§ 87 ff., esp. 99 – 
in those cases, the unilateral act stood against an 
international treaty). Beyond practical incidences on the 
qualification of the consent to arbitration and its legal 
regime in such a case, the conceptual challenge is the 
Page 4 of 11Investors’ Rights Short of Human Rights in a Constitutional Perspective | Völkerrecht...
05.10.2017https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/investors-rights-short-of-human-rights-in-a-constitutiona...
following: Considering the diversity of ways (with or without 
an arbitration clause, connected or not to a treaty) investor-
state arbitration is conducted before different courts (ICSID 
or UNCITRAL or SCC or ICC tribunals, etc.), is it doctrinally 
relevant to assume that these mechanisms are all 
compulsory international modes of settlement of disputes? 
If they are, a first condition is met to align 
internationalisation of investor-state legal relationships with 
publicization through public international law. It is then less 
paradoxical – but still not persuasive – to consider investor-
state arbitration as a form of global administrative law or a 
contribution to global constitutionalism.
For her part, Anne Peters postulates (rather than 
demonstrates) that investor-state arbitration has the double 
function of realizing private and public interests (265) and 
even characterizes it as typical for international actions of 
individuals (chapter 15, with a first point expressively titled 
« Individuen als Hüter des objektiven Völkerrechts »). The 
difficult question of whether this depends on the nature of 
the jurisdictions they turn to will be asked but not discussed 
here.
Proper material rights
Now, the object of the dispute settled by arbitrators has to 
be identified. Let’s turn to material rights allegedly violated.
Anne Peters seems to be equally skeptical towards the 
elevation of isolated state contract up to the rank of 
international treaties (267-271) and towards the 
transformation of municipal law obligations into 
international obligations through the umbrella clause of a 
BIT (271-274). She rather goes along with Alvik in writing that 
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« To the extent that such (investment law) standards protect 
interests created by contractual commitments, an investor 
acquires individual rights under international law by virtue 
of the contract » (273). This might preserve the unity of 
arbitral tribunals dealing with both contract and treaty 
claims, since they are ultimately judges of the realization of 
international standards: Their quality does not change with 
the cause – except when there is no bond between a 
contract and international law. A question remains open if 
one does not consider the quasi-monopol of arbitrators on 
investor-state dispute as structural or eternal: How should a 
domestic tribunal balance the material provisions of a 
contract under umbrella clause with a national statute in 
case of contradiction? The question of autonomy of the 
umbrella clause (typically : « Each party shall observe any 
obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
investments ») and its effects (direct or not) might be raised.
Still, Anne Peters mostly devotes her attention to rights 
simply arising from international investment treaties (274-
286). In the silence of treaties on the creditors of state 
obligations, diverging doctrines of « direct » and « derivative 
rights » have been defended. Surprisingly enough, Anne 
Peters seems to conceptually admit that a private foreign 
investor should be vested with the right to go to court for 
the protection either of his own rights or those of the state 
of origin, if not for the good implementation of objective law 
(which here seems to overlap with the interests of states) 
(275 + footnote 74). The assumption that the defense of state 
interests and rights (finally both those of the host and home 
states) could be delegated to foreigners completely free to 
make use of their procedural rights before arbitrators they 
contributed to nominate seems difficult to reconcile with 
usual constitutional schemes or emergent global 
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constitutional schemes – even with an homage to French 
administrative law (419-421; see nuances, 305).
Scrutinizing the drafting of investment treaties, Anne Peters 
nonetheless approves the « direct rights » doctrine that best 
reflects the nature of obligations subscribed to by states. 
One can but agree with her that viewing the ICSID system as 
a kind of « institutionalisation of diplomatic protection » or a 
« reversed » diplomatic protection is nonsense (279). Still, it 
remains to be explored why such a (mis)conception could be 
upheld for so long or debated so seriously. One result was 
that the eviction of domestic courts could not be 
constitutionally questioned for long. Be that as it may, 
investors were denied any right to diplomatic protection; as 
an advantageous compensation, it was endorsed that they 
were endowed with the procedural right to bring demands 
in their own name to arbitral tribunals, in brief: First with 
procedural rights and eventually with material ones too.
Here, Anne Peters makes three important submissions. First, 
this did not occur through mechanisms analogous to 
« contracts without privity » (the analogies with private law 
institutions are rebutted) but through law-making treaties 
(the analogy with statutes is privileged) (281-282).
Second, it could and should be presumed (not irrefutably) 
that investment treaty provisions create direct rights for 
private persons (286).
Third, such a presumption entails a dynamics in the 
construction of investment treaties (287). Should the treaty 
bestow rights on investors, then it should be construed 
according to legitimate expectations of investors. This is 
perhaps going a step too far. Either this should be true of 
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any provision or treaty creating rights for private persons, or 
this should be justified in the light of analogies sometimes 
(imprudently) suggested with human rights treaties. The 
former would certainly be an overstatement with regard to 
current international law. The latter brings us back to the 
good use of analogies: Investors’ rights may overlap with 
human rights; it is not to say they have the same nature (on 
criteria of distinction: chapter 14; for further discussion: S. 
Cuendet (ed.), Le droit des investissements étrangers : 
approche globale, Larcier, forthcoming, 2016).   
Last but not least, the practical consequences of the reading 
proposed by Anne Peters – exclusion from terms of 
reference of statements made by states during a 
proceedings (287), dynamic interpretation (287-288), possible 
survival of the convention guarantees even in case of 
consensual termination (288-289)… –, result in 
constitutionalizing investment treaties (in the trivial sense 
that they are deprived of any element of flexibility decades 
long). Still, they are enforced most of the time by investor-
state tribunals. All in all, this amounts to entrusting a 
constitution to private hands. The author herself steps back 
and advocates with sensible political agreements that states 
should not be barred from adopting counter-measures at 
the cost of investors protected by a BIT (see nuances, 292-
295).
Proper secondary rights
Conceptually admitting some possible discrepancies 
between holding primary rights and secondary rights (i.e., 
here a right to pecuniary compensation for losses inflicted 
on the investor), Anne Peters assumes that the investor is in 
law the true holder of secondary rights (301) as provided for 
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by the law of international state responsibility. This point 
was much debated in doctrine and was left unresolved by 
the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility (2001, art. 33). Anne 
Peters agrees with James Crawford’s comment on the said 
Articles by cautiously asserting the ultimate consequences 
of previous assumptions and drawing support from arbitral 
practice.
Perhaps she could have gone several steps beyond. First, 
isn’t it fairly consistent with general principles of law that 
the holder of a material right, here the investor, be the 
holder of the right to remedies (from access to a court up to 
repair) – unless the contracting states reserved their right to 
dispose of his secondary rights?
Second, it is crucial to assess whether « the liability created 
by this sub-system of international responsibility is (…) more 
adequately described as having a transnational commercial 
nature in view of the commercial interests at the heart of 
the dispute » (to borrow from the terms of Z. Douglas, cited, 
297, footnote 163) – or not. The construction of such 
provisions as articles 42 and 54.1 of the ICSID Convention or 
article 1135-1 of NAFTA is key. The compensation is certainly 
due to the claimant (the investor). Yet, did state parties 
intend to partially depart from the law of state responsibility 
by depriving investors of their right to other forms of 
restitutio in integrum or to substitute that regime with 
commercial compensation (see also chapter 6)? If the latter 
were the case, investor-state arbitration could not be 
described as a mechanism of settlement of (true) 
international disputes, and even less as an alternative mode 
of judicial review of domestic statutes, regulations, and 
decisions. What is more, this qualification could impact the 
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way constitutional courts should appreciate the delegation 
of power from domestic courts to arbitral tribunals.
The quest for the legal status of private persons in the 
international system is inextricably linked to the reshaping 
of national constitutional systems. This status can be 
warranted beyond the state but, given the public interests at 
stake – so conspicuous in investment matters –, not as a 
disavowal of the most basic requirements of (national) 
constitutional law or without any review of its compatibility 
with national constitutional rules. In a word – 
notwithstanding minor or major disagreements expressed 
here and there: Anne Peters’ magistral publication validates 
her intuition that constitutionalism is a relevant approach to 
contemporary international law.
Evelyne Lagrange is Professor of Law at Université de Paris I.
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